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Late last term, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 
holding that a closely-held, for-profit company is a “person” for purposes of exercising 
religious rights that can be protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
of 1996, as determined by its owner’s sincerely-held religious beliefs and values.1 In so 
holding, the Court upended the foundational corporate law principle that the incorporated 
firm is a separate juridical “person,” and is not coterminous with its owners, a principle 
that has long been recognized even where there is only one person owning all of the incor-
porated firm’s stock.2 The Court’s rationale also undermined views of the for-profit cor-
poration as simply an economic entity with wealth-maximizing as its only legitimate pur-
pose, recognizing that: 
 
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corpora-
tions is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit 
corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many 
                                                          
 * Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Professor of Law (Emerita), 
University of Illinois College of Law.  
 1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 2. In the common law countries of the UK, U.S., and Canada, this principle is traced to Salomon v. Salomon 
& Co., [1897] AC 33 (HL). In that opinion, creditors of A. Salomon & Co., Ltd. sought payment from Aron 
Salomon for debts incurred by A. Salomon & Co., which the House of Lords construed as a “one-man firm” 
wholly owned by Aron Salomon. Lord Herschell, in ruling against the creditors, in one paragraph put into place 
concepts that remain foundational today, to whit:  
I am at a loss to understand what is meant by saying that A Salomon & Co, Ltd is but an 
alias for A Salomon. It is not another name for the same person; the company is ex hy-
pothesi a distinct legal person. As little am I able to adopt the view that the company was 
the agent of Salomon to carry on his business for him. In a popular sense a company may 
in every case be said to carry on business for and on behalf of its shareholders, but this 
certainly does not on point of law constitute the relation of principal and agent between 
them or render the shareholders liable to indemnify the company against the debts which 
it incurs.   
Id. As discussed below, economic accounts of the corporation continue to mistake the agency relationships within 
the firm by suggesting that the shareholders are the “principal” in the relationship and the board of directors their 
agent. See infra text accompanying note 28.  
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do not do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support 
a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for 
such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. 
Many examples come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a 
for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-con-
servation measures that go beyond what the law requires. A for-profit 
corporation that operates facilities in other countries may exceed the re-
quirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits. If 
for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no 
apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.3 
 
While there is much to criticize in the Court’s opinion from a corporate law perspec-
tive, particularly its misconception that shareholders have the power to approve—or not—
of management decisions regarding charitable, social, environmental, or economic activi-
ties (except, perhaps, by using the legal fiction of approval by virtue of buying or selling 
shares based on the firm’s social or political activities), this is not the place to develop 
those criticisms.4 What is clear, however, is that the Court is continuing a trend begun in 
Citizens Union v. Federal Election Commission, one that construes the for-profit corpora-
tion as having a social and political nature beyond its economic purposes.5 
Without suggesting that Professor Eric Orts would necessarily agree with the Court’s 
holding in Hobby Lobby, the broader conception of the corporation that the Court relies 
upon is consistent with Orts’ institutional theory of the firm, as developed in his book, 
Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm.6 In the preface to his book, Orts sets out a 
number of reasons to suggest that the purely economic theories of the firm that have dom-
inated scholarship for the last several decades are not sufficient to capture the complex 
reality of the modern business firm.7 Among those reasons, he argues that law is necessary 
for a full understanding of the social origins and foundations of firms,8 is essential to con-
sidering the “multiple values” beyond efficiency that can “structure organizations” and be 
                                                          
 3. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.   
 4. The persuasive power of that legal fiction is undermined by the fact that shareholders do not have access 
to clear, comprehensive, comparable information about a firm’s charitable, social, environmental or political 
activities, despite longstanding academic attention to the issue. See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, 
Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens’ United, 9:4 J. OF EMP. L. STUD. 657, 659, 661 (2012) (showing 
that political contributions are negatively correlated with shareholder value, and thus arguing that the SEC should 
require disclosure of such contributions); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the 
Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 579, 586 (1997) (arguing that the SEC should require 
disclosure of corporate philanthropy, because managers of firms can use charitable giving to mask conflict of 
interest transactions and board vote buying); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission 
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1999) (arguing that the SEC has the legis-
lative authority to require expanded social and environmental disclosure, and that it should do so in order to 
provide investors with consistent, comparable facts about companies’ social and environmental performance, 
domestically and globally).  
 5. See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). This author has criti-
cized Citizens United from a corporate law perspective. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Trends in 
the Social [Ir]responsibility of American Multinational Corporations: Increased Power, Diminished Accounta-
bility, 25 FORDHAM ENVIR. L. REV. 46 (2013).  
 6. ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013). 
 7. Id. at ix. 
 8. Id. at x. 
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss2/14
2015] EMERGING PERSONALITY 535 
used to “resolv[e] disputes,”9 and that these multiple underlying philosophical theories of 
the firm can “[un]shackle the imagination with respect to the purposes of firms.”10 
In this calm, thoughtful, important, and impeccably-sourced book, Orts constructs 
an institutional theory of the firm as a social and economic institution, one “both author-
ized and recognized by governments,”11 as emphasized by top-down, concession theories 
of the firm, but also “managed by [and constructed by] individual participants,”12 as em-
phasized by bottom-up, contractarian views. Chapter one is entitled “Foundations of the 
Firm I: Business Entities and Legal Persons,” and in it Orts argues that we need not choose 
between these two competing versions of corporate theory. Orts relies upon H.L.A. Hart 
and John Dewey to suggest that what matters are the consequences for specific policy 
issues.13 As he puts the point: 
 
At a minimum, the institutional theory assumes that both government 
and business participants have legitimate, substantive claims that de-
serve recognition . . . . The institutional theory of the firm is minimalist 
with respect to substantive political content because it leaves open for 
elaboration both (1) what substantive legal rules and restrictions govern-
ment may impose; and (2) how far the aims and interests of business 
participants should be legally protected. In other words, the scope and 
breadth of substantive claims made by government (for regulation) and 
business participants (for limits on regulation and protection of their 
rights and interests) remain open for determination—both theoretically 
(through scholarly study and policy debate) and institutionally (through 
legal and political processes).14 
 
While Orts may construe his institutional theory as minimalist with respect to sub-
stantive political content, as his discussion unfolds it becomes clear that the book is, in 
fact, an extended argument against the “standard [contractarian] economic view” that has 
considered “firms as merely ‘fictions,’” and as first theorized by Eugene Fama as “a set of 
contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest.”15 
And that argument by Orts, within the discipline of corporate law scholarship, is political. 
Orts takes his argument forward by carefully showing the problematic aspects of every 
construct central to the contractarian view, while also demonstrating the necessity for le-
gal, rather than purely economic, rules for constructing today’s corporations. 
In chapter one, Orts argues that even “the starting assumption of a natural human 
being as the relevant ‘person’ or unit assumed for economic analysis is problematic and 
                                                          
 9. Id. at xi.  
 10. Id. at xiii. 
 11. Id. at 14. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 17-19. See also H.L.A. HART, Definitions and Theory in Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 43-47 (1983); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 655-56, 660 (1926).  
 14. ORTS, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
 15. Id. at 27 (quoting Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POLIT. ECON. 288, 
289 (1980)). 
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requires law for definition and recognition.”16 Orts relies upon Joseph Vining’s work to 
show the many ways in which human beings have identities that shift depending on law 
and the legal context (such as a citizen versus a non-citizen in court, or with respect to the 
nation-state).17 Even “if one concedes that firms are ‘artificial legal fictions,’ [comprised 
of human beings], they are legal fictions with social consequences that are real, practical, 
and large.”18 One can describe the business corporation as a legal fiction in the “sense that 
they are invented (in general) and created (in specific instances) by human beings who use 
established legal methods and processes to do so.”19 Once so invented, however, the cor-
poration becomes “socially ‘real’” in accordance with internal and external “legal rules, 
principles and understandings.”20 Connecting this discussion to the concept of “legal enti-
ties” (such as parent/subsidiary relationships, whose separate existence is also a “legal 
fiction”) and “juridical persons,” Orts demystifies the sense in which a corporation is a 
legal person, that is, a bearer of rights and duties, for some, but not all purposes.21 Orts 
concludes, in chapter one, that “an institutional theory of the firm asserts that concepts of 
‘fictions,’ ‘entities’ and ‘[juridical] persons’ are foundational to understanding business 
enterprises,”22 but also that these types of concepts are not unique to corporations or mys-
terious in the law. 
In chapter two, Orts unravels the constructs of agents and agency law, contracts, and 
property, each of which is a foundational element in the standard economic view of the 
firm as a nexus of contracts. Orts starts the analysis by stating that “[f]irms of any com-
plexity beyond a single individual cannot exist without the law of agency.”23 Agency law 
structures the relationships between principals (the firm acting as “juridical persons”), its 
agents (its governing body and CEO, as quasi-principals, and employees as agents and 
sub-agents) and third parties, both by imposing fiduciary duties on the quasi-principals 
and agents and by creating structures of authority and control.24 Agency law can also pro-
vide some help in defining the boundaries of the firm,25 although cannot completely ac-
complish that task, because in addition to internal agency relationships there are also ex-
ternal agency relationships, such as “arms-length contracts with services providers.”26  
Determining the boundaries of the firm is difficult in a world enmeshed in a web of 
agency,27 but is a particularly nettlesome problem for contractarians: if a firm is nothing 
but a nexus of contracts, how are we to know which of a firm’s thousands or even millions 
of contracts are within the firm and which are not? The answer cannot be “it doesn’t mat-
ter,” because issues of fiduciary duties, authority, and responsibility between the firm and 
                                                          
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 28. 
 18. Id. at 29. 
 19. Id. at 30. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 30-49. 
 22. Id. at 51. 
 23. Id. at 54. 
 24. Id. at 54-60. 
 25. Id. at 62. 
 26. Id. at 61. 
 27. See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 
1635 (1999).  
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those outside it depend on where those boundaries are drawn. Contrary to the standard 
economic theory of the firm, an accurate understanding of agency law shows that share-
holders are not the principal in the corporate firm, except perhaps in a controlled corpora-
tion where one or a few shareholders own a controlling block of shares. As stated by the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency Law, “a ‘true agency’ is ‘not present’ in the ‘relationship 
between a corporation’s shareholders and its directors.”28 Fundamental to a true agency is 
the ability of the principal to control the agent’s actions, which is not a power that share-
holders in a public corporation have. 
Orts next discusses not only the importance of contracts within firms, but also their 
insufficiency in explaining all aspects of the firm. Missing in such an account are organi-
zational realities such as hierarchies and management authority (some of which are 
grounded in contracts, some in agency law, some by actions of corporate officials, some 
in norms such as fairness, relationship, trust, and so forth);29 collective ownership of prop-
erty within the firm; and the legal recognition of the firm as an entity separate from its 
constituents.30 Orts also shows that property and its ownership (and management) is not 
simple and so cannot provide the seed around which a nexus of contracts can form and a 
reasonable facsimile of a firm crystalize. Firms possess tangible property,31 intangible 
property (which critically depends on rights of legal recognition, as conflicts between Chi-
nese and U.S. intellectual property regimes show),32 and fractured ownership interests with 
rights to various capital flows, as elaborated by Berle and Means, with various governance 
implications that follow particularly from the use of debt versus equity.33 Moreover, simple 
contractarian views of the firm miss important, real-world fracturing of ownership and 
control, such as that provided by parent/subsidiary pyramidal ownership, which permits 
financial as well as operational control of controlled companies with far less than majority 
ownership, and which account for “more than one-quarter of the largest companies in the 
world.”34 And contractarians, who obsess about the agency costs of the separation of own-
ership from control, have not sufficiently encompassed in their theories “the large, self-
organizing, and significantly ‘autonomous’ firm,” whose growth is made possible by re-
tained earnings and thus is not selling either new equity or debt and so not taking on new 
capital ownership obligations.35 Far from being a minor character in the corporate finance 
dramatis personae, studies have shown that retained earnings are “‘the primary method of 
finance’ in most developed countries, including France, Germany, Japan, the United King-
dom, and the United States.”36 Thus, even a sophisticated understanding of the classic im-
plications of “the separation of ownership from and control,” as developed by Berle and 
                                                          
 28. ORTS, supra note 14, at 60. 
 29. Id. at 65-68 (citing, inter alia, Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Cor-
porate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1989); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 60-61 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 
1990); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989)). 
 30. Id. at 65.  
 31. Id. at 71, 73. 
 32. Id. at 75-78. 
 33. Id. at 78-90.  
 34. Id. at 92-93 (citing Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership 
around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 499-500 & tbl. IV (1999), for estimates of pyramidal ownership).  
 35. Id. at 102-04. 
 36. Id. at 103 (citing FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 363 (2000); 
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Means in the 1930s, misses much of the complexity of ownership of rights in today’s 
business firm, Orts argues.37 
Chapter three, entitled “The Public/Private Distinction: Two Faces of the Business 
Enterprise,” rejects the view that the public/private distinction is “unhelpful” in under-
standing the modern business corporation.38 In response to the “unhelpful” claim, Orts 
discusses a number of different ways to understand “the public/private distinction,” such 
as between government or private ownership of shares in companies; or between public 
(regulation) versus private (contract) sources of control within the firm: he connects those 
concepts to his institutional theory of the firm, arguing “that business enterprises are nei-
ther entirely ‘private’ nor entirely ‘public.’”39 Sustaining that latter argument is central to 
Orts’ project, and so an extended quote is in order: 
 
To accept the importance of the public/private distinction does not mean 
to say that business enterprises are to be understood as only ‘private’ 
rather than ‘public’ entities . . . Instead, firms have two faces: public and 
private. They are created, recognized, and regulated by public authori-
ties, namely, governments. They are also composed of private interests 
and private participants who deserve some level of legal recognition by 
and protection from government. The relative balance between the pub-
lic and the private elements of firms are continually contested in both 
theory and practice . . . . The hard choices of regulation focus on the 
scope of recognition to be given to private organizations and the extent 
to which they should be required to shoulder public obligations of one 
kind or another.40 
 
The first aspect of the public/private distinction that Orts discusses is with respect to 
the ownership of firms by either private investors or the state.41 While it is clear that some 
property is public and some private, business firms in different societies “present a shifting 
mix of state-owned and privately-owned enterprises, as well as hybrid forms,” even in-
cluding state-owned or hybrid businesses in the U.S. (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, taxpayer-funded bailouts of financial firms, Amtrak, the U.S. Post Office, and the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting), versus state capitalism in China which also exhibits 
thriving private-firms.42 The implications of these different ownership structures for his 
central theory are not clearly articulated, but perhaps are obvious. 
The next difference between public and private that Orts articulates is with respect 
                                                          
Colin Mayer, Corporate Governance, Competition, and Performance, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 152, 164-65 (1997) 
(showing that retained earnings leads all other sources of new financing in those five countries). 
 37. Id. at 79. 
 38. Id. at 109 (citing Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1423 (1982) and Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1349 (1982), for the concept that the distinction is “unhelpful”).  
 39. Id. at 123.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 110. 
 42.  Id. at 110-11.  
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to how law treats and justifies “private property” and “private contract,” relying upon Mor-
ris Cohen’s work.43 Beyond property and contract, the distinction matters in evaluating 
“the rights to self-organize and various freedoms that are recognized in the workplace,” as 
well as determining the sources and permissible ambit of social control within the business 
firm.44 Having concluded that the distinction matters does not imply that it is easy to draw 
the line between matters of public versus private concern, particularly given “privatiza-
tion” of traditionally public institutions (the military or prison administration, for in-
stance).45 That difficulty implies that the line-drawing can only be sensibly done with re-
spect to particular issues (such as “whether employees should possess ‘public’ rights of 
free speech in ‘private’ workplaces”), and with reference to social values outside of the 
law.46 This latter point is Orts’ response to the “indeterminacy” argument concerning the 
public/private divide. 
In response to structural critiques that arguments of private rights of contract and 
property can be used as “show-stoppers,” for instance as against labor rights or environ-
mental considerations, Orts contends that “arguments invoking private rights may favor 
different groups that have historically had less influence (such as employees or dispersed 
shareholders) as well as groups that have usually held greater social power (such as top 
managers or wealthy owners.”47 How that might be done is not developed in any detail. 
Rather than a Marxist argument that: 
 
den[ies] any zone of legal coverage to private rights, the more moderate 
position adopted here seems preferable and more persuasive, namely: to 
recognize the legal distinction between public and private as salient—
and then to allow and encourage policy debates with respect to where 
the lines should be drawn.48 
 
While Orts’ argument that public values can be—and should be—permitted to affect 
the internal workings of the firm is persuasive, at least to this reader, Orts is less persuasive 
in his discussion of the opposite concern: the private business firm’s ability to participate 
in and shape public regulation. As he puts the point: 
 
In principle at least, it is not clear why the possession of wealth or other 
resources should disqualify citizens from influencing the political pro-
cess of regulation, as long as these resources are not used coercively to 
                                                          
 43. Id. 112-13 (citing Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927); Morris R. 
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933)).   
 44.  Id. at 113. He recognizes that this point is, in effect, a recapitulation of the general conundrum of whether 
one construes the business firm as a top-down creature of public law, as in Dartmouth College, or as a bottom-
up relationship among the participants in any one individual firm.  
 45. Id. at 117. 
 46. Id. at 118-19 (citing Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1992), while recognizing that the existence of a public/private distinction is a highly-contested issue in feminist 
legal theory). See, e.g., Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 
10 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1993).   
 47. ORTS, supra note 6, at 121. 
 48. Id. 
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silence or buy off other less well-endowed citizens and thereby control 
political results. These concerns support legal prohibitions against polit-
ically motivated coercion, such as bribery and vote-buying in elections, 
for example—and may support limitations on campaign contributions 
as well (taken up in Chapter Seven). A general political concern is war-
ranted that an oligarchy of business-connected wealth could arise and 
exert a controlling influence on political process and legal regulation. 
This is an ancient and continuing concern in political theory, and it is an 
important theme, though one that lies mostly outside the scope of this 
book.49 
 
The power of private business interests to shape public regulation and “control political 
results” in accordance with self-interested conceptions of the good goes beyond coercion 
or silencing, however, as too many recent analyses have shown.50 Moreover, economic 
inequality in the U.S. is growing in significant part because of the rise of the “super-man-
agerial elite” within U.S. business,51 and we see a convergence in policy preferences be-
tween the ultra-wealthy and business interests, which is having a demonstrable effect on 
policy outcomes at the federal level.52 Thus it seems more consideration of this aspect of 
the public/private distinction should have been in order. 
To be fair, in ending the chapter with a lengthy discussion of Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward as a “concluding example of the social importance of the public/
private distinction,”53 Orts recognizes the importance of the question of whether “empow-
ering private corporations too much would threaten to corrupt the public political process” 
and states again that it is an “important political dimension of the public/private distinc-
tion” that is “not addressed at length in this book.”54 And he states that he hopes to take up 
these difficult “issues regarding politics and business enterprises in future work.”55 Given 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 122 (describing “oligarchy” as a perverse form of government “directed to the interest of the well-
to-do” as opposed to healthy forms of government “directed to the advantage of the whole body of citizens”) 
(internal citation omitted).  
 50. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER TAKE ALL POLITICS (2010) (describing how pol-
icy positions supported by a majority of Americans fail to become law today given the influence of elite prefer-
ences and money in politics); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT MELTDOWN (2010) (discussing how federal economic policies have been driven by “ideological 
capture” and the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street). 
 51. See, e.g., CHRYSTIA FREELAND, PLUTOCRATS: THE RISE OF THE NEW GLOBAL SUPER-RICH AND THE 
FALL OF EVERYONE ELSE 14, 130-40 (2012) (discussing the escalation in CEO pay); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 315-21 (2014) (presenting data showing that, in all the English-speaking coun-
tries including in the U.S., “the primary reason for increased income inequality in recent decades is the rise of 
the supermanager in both the financial and nonfinancial sectors”).  
 52. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups 
and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 564 (2014) (evaluating the response of Congress on 1,779 
policy issues, and finding evidence of economic elite domination and biased (business plus wealthy individuals) 
pluralism affecting the policies adopted). 
 53. ORTS, supra note 6, at 126; Dartmouth College v. Woodwards, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). In Dartmouth 
College, the Supreme Court recognized the authority of government to “determine the rules of the game with 
respect to the formation of private organizations,” but also held that once organized there are constitutional limits 
on how the state may change the rules of the game for organizations already formed. Id.  
 54. ORTS, supra note 7, at 130. 
 55. Id. at 122 n.68. 
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his thoughtful contributions to a legal theory of the firm in this book, Orts should be en-
couraged in that regard. 
Chapters four and five, while replete with excellent sources and statistics, are more 
descriptive chapters geared, it seems, to a general or an interdisciplinary audience than 
they are theoretical or conceptual chapters engaging with legal academics’ arguments over 
the nature of the corporation. That said, both introduce new developments in the business 
world and suggest avenues for future analysis and policy development, and so are likely 
to engage the attention of even expert readers. Chapter four, “Enterprise Liability, Busi-
ness Participant Liability, and Limited Liability,” discusses each of these concepts in turn, 
noting the ability of companies to structure their enterprises in ways that can have the 
effect of allowing uncompensated harm (such as by the use of separately-incorporated 
subsidiaries in various countries in which the enterprise does business, or by the use of 
franchise structures or independent contractors rather than employees to adjust the borders 
of enterprise liability).56 Orts is more normative in this discussion than in many other parts 
of the book, asserting that “[i]n general, business enterprise conducted through the use of 
multiple entities requires an updating of principles of enterprise liability to focus on the 
nature of firms operating at this level of complexity and integration,”57 while recognizing 
that enterprise liability has been recognized more broadly in Germany and the European 
Union than it has been in the United States or Great Britain.58 While Hobby Lobby is likely 
to be sui generis, one potential implication of that opinion, if carried forward, would be to 
soften the borders of separate existence between shareholders (such as parent companies) 
and separately incorporated subsidiaries.59 We are a long way from that outcome, but prin-
ciples of enterprise liability bear serious reconsideration given the global reach of the 
country’s largest companies, concerns that global corporate accountability has been un-
dermined by the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, and the inconsistent 
and financially beneficial treatment of global firms as enterprises for tax and transfer pric-
ing purposes.60  
Chapter five continues Orts’ methodological institutionalism, recognizing the im-
portance of both institutions and the individuals within them, to describe the range of busi-
ness firms today in terms of interactive dimensions of capital ownership, governance, and 
agency authority.61 Data and analysis using those “interactive dimensions” are provided 
on the “standard range” of business entities, including sole proprietorships, partnerships, 
cooperatives, limited liability partnerships (LLPs), limited liability companies (LLCs), 
small and large firms (which roughly, but not entirely, track closely-held corporations and 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 137-44. 
 57. Id. at 145-46 (relying on PHILIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS (2005)). Pro-
fessor Blumberg has been a pioneer in the (so-far unsuccessful) effort to persuade courts in the U.S. of the im-
portance of enterprise liability.  
 58. Id. at 146. 
 59. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 60. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (holding that the Alien Torts Claims Act 
(“ATCA”) does not apply extraterritorially). The ATCA had been the primary statute giving subject matter ju-
risdiction to U.S. federal courts to hear claims against companies for alleged violations of plaintiffs’ international 
human rights abroad.  
 61. Orts, supra note 6, at 182.  
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widely-held corporations).62 Orts also devotes substantial attention to types of enterprises 
that are often ignored, at least in many law professors’ business associations classes, in-
cluding government and state-owned enterprises,63 charitable and nonprofit enterprises,64 
and hybrid social enterprises.65 This chapter is stuffed with excellent data on numbers of 
these entities, total revenues, total payrolls, trends and comparative data covering a wide 
range of countries. Orts includes a separate sub-chapter to what he calls “complex rela-
tional firms,”66 including corporate groups, franchise firms (with data showing that fran-
chise firms accounted for over one-third of retail sales in the U.S. in 2010), joint ventures, 
marketing alliances, cooperatives and so forth.67 Again, Orts returns to the questions of the 
boundaries of the firm, whether arrangements of ownership and control “amount to ‘inte-
gration’ sufficient to perceive a coherent enterprise,” and how companies’ formations of 
complex business relationships can or should be used to limit liability and reduce taxes.68 
Orts’ general argument is that “an economic decision to structure a business enterprise to 
avoid potential liability should not dispose of questions about whether the method of 
avoidance should be legally respected as a matter of public policy.”69 The chapter ends 
with a discussion of corporate responsibility and the range of ethical cultures within 
firms.70 As throughout the book, this chapter contains a wide range of sources for further 
development of the ideas and arguments for interested readers. 
The final chapters in the book are short. Chapter six, “Managing and Regulating the 
Shifting Boundaries of the Firm,” summarizes the author’s arguments in the rest of the 
book, emphasizing how the boundaries of firms have important implications for questions 
of responsibility, liability and regulatory design. In his summary, Orts asserts that in con-
structing regulatory regimes “[t]he legal theory of the firm advanced here is . . . compatible 
with an array of normative orientations and approaches” including law and economics, 
which emphasizes economic efficiency, or with “others [who] may argue that the norma-
tive principles of democracy and political equality should take precedence.”71 Given how 
much of the book is an argument against law and economics and the contractarian views 
of the business firm, at least insofar as those views would purport to be a complete de-
scription of the firm, that assertion of compatibility is mysterious. Clarifying that comment 
is Orts’ 
 
own intuition that competing values—including economic efficient, de-
mocracy, deontological duties (such as honesty and loyalty), and distrib-
utive justice—will prove more or less compelling in different situations. 
At least descriptively, it is inaccurate to say that any one particular value 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 175-91. 
 63. Id. at 194-200. 
 64. Id. at 200-06. 
 65. Id. at 206-15. 
 66. Id. at 191. 
 67. Id. (citing Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 196-97 (2010)). 
 68. Id. at 192-93. 
 69. Id. at 192. 
 70. Id. at 222. 
 71. Id. at 228. 
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(such as overall social welfare maximization as determined from an eco-
nomic perspective) is dominant in current legal practice.72 
 
To the extent that he is distinguishing here between legal practice and academic the-
ory, then his compatibility statement makes more sense, given that corporate law decisions 
emphasize the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,73 and do not try to tie them to a concept 
of economic efficiency. Still, since most of the book has been an argument against the law 
and economics’ conception of the firm, Orts perhaps should have been more careful in 
how he summarized his argument in this chapter. 
Chapter seven, entitled “Two Applications,” shows two examples of how having a 
broader theory of the firm can help in thinking about difficult issues involving business 
corporations: levels of executive compensation and the constitutional rights of political 
speech for corporations. Regarding executive compensation, Orts argues that a theory of 
the firm that is concerned only with shareholders and top managers, as is the relationship 
of interest if the “separation of ownership from control” is one’s analytic framework, 
misses important implications in evaluating excessive levels of executive compensation.74 
Direct concerns include the effects on employees’ productivity and morale generally from 
compensation structures deemed unfair.75 Indirect concerns include the potential negative 
effects on the long-term investments of the firm, including in research and development, 
from an excessive focus on share price that can occur when top managers are compensated 
with stock options, as well as concerns that “high-powered incentives” for top managers 
have also created “temptations to commit accounting fraud.”76 Orts asserts that “[o]nce the 
mainstream principal-agent economic model of the firm is rejected as too narrow, simple, 
and naïve (at least with respect to many firms), a path towards other possible law reform 
opens.”77 This assertion seems undoubtedly true, since a theory that emphasizes the insti-
tutional aspects of the firm has both internal and external consequences. Internally, such a 
theory yields concerns about the ethical climate of the firm, employees’ perceptions of 
fairness and the effects of those perceptions on productivity and “employee citizenship.” 
And externally, an institutional theory allows a broader role for regulation to import public 
values, since the firm is understood to be more than a nexus of (privately-developed and 
enforced) contracts. Yet the examples Orts provides of other possible law reforms to ad-
dress executive compensation are not particularly persuasive since they do not go beyond 
either existing measures (disclosure) or ideas already discussed and/or rejected: enhanced 
disclosure of executive compensation, enhanced judicial scrutiny of executive compensa-
tion as self-interested, and more progressive income taxation—the latter of which he es-
sentially takes off the table as “overinclusive” since it would address “broader concerns of 
inequality.”78 Thus, this application ends up being unsatisfying, although the fundamental 
point—that an institutional theory of the firm allows more room for policy invention—
                                                          
 72. Id. at 229. 
 73. Id. at 70. 
 74. Id. at 233. 
 75. Id. at 234 n.19. 
 76. Id. at 235-37. 
 77. Id. at 237. 
 78. Id. at 238-39. 
11
Williams: The Emerging Personality of the American Corporation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
544 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:533  
remains powerful. 
Regarding constitutional protections for political speech, Orts’ application of his 
theory is somewhat more satisfying: he articulates the problem of where to draw the line 
of permissible regulation of corporate political speech with specificity, relying upon his 
institutional theory.79 Using the competing majority and dissenting opinions in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, Orts treats Justice Kennedy’s majority decision’s 
broad protection of corporations’ political free-speech rights as consistent with the bottom-
up, participant view of the corporation, even as the majority goes beyond pre-existing 
precedent and “does not . . . provide a full-fledged legal theory to explain why business 
corporations should have a right of political free speech equivalent to individual citi-
zens.”80 Orts suggests that the rights of persons and firms should not necessary be coter-
minous, given compelling governmental concerns of corruption of the political process 
that are more cogent with the advantages of the business firm than with wealthy individu-
als, but since “business firms are composed of people [they] therefore should, derivatively, 
have their constitutional rights recognized.”81 The Stevens’ dissent, Orts suggests, is con-
sistent with the top-down view of the concession theory, with its long-standing concern 
for political corruption, and greater ambit for regulatory power.82 
Bringing these perspectives together into a coherent whole is the difficult task that 
Orts attempts. He does this primarily by focusing on the point that business corporations 
are constructed to advance economic purposes, which does not imply shared political per-
spectives, nor do internal corporate governance mechanisms “work to transmit political 
preferences.”83 Thus, at the least Orts would support “a robust regulatory system of ‘dis-
claimers and disclosure’ of the organizations and individual identities of donors to political 
campaigns and political media operations,” as discussed in Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Citizens United.84 To address the problem of corruption “requires at least some 
direct substantive regulation, such as the prohibition of bribery.”85 Again, as with respect 
to executive compensation, Orts’ ultimate policy solutions seem more restrained than his 
theory would require. The system of disclosure of political contributions does not address 
the point that the for-profit corporation is not constructed to aggregate political prefer-
ences, and bribery is not the only concern with for-profit corporations’ direct involvement 
in the electoral process. 
 A more persuasive analysis of the problem of identifying the proper scope of cor-
porate political constitutional rights was that recently provided by Margaret Blair and Eliz-
abeth Pollman, who show that prior to Citizens United, corporations’ free speech consti-
tutional rights were understood to be derivative rights.86 Thus, such rights were either 
necessary to protect the property interests of the individuals comprising the corporation 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 245. 
 80. Id. at 241, 244. 
 81. Id. at 245. This argument does not address the point that the people who invest in and work for corpora-
tions can assert their electoral political rights and views directly.  
 82. Id. at 244-45. 
 83. Id. at 246. 
 84. Id. at 249. 
 85. Id. at 250. 
 86. Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
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(as in speaking about a corporate tax issue, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti),87 
or were necessary to provide information to the hearers of commercial speech (as in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy).88 They would argue that, in determining when political free speech rights 
should be extended to juridical persons, the courts should pay attention to differences in 
the type of “person”: non-profits and ideological political action campaigns can be under-
stood as aggregates of their members from whom political rights can be derived; for-profit 
corporations can generally not be so construed.89 
And yet, to say that this reader would have liked to have seen Orts go further in 
developing solutions in both examples is not to suggest that this undermines his institu-
tional theory. His general points remain persuasive: first, that an institutional theory of the 
corporation more accurately describes the legal, social, political and organizational reality 
of the modern business firm than does a nexus of contracts, participant-based conception; 
and second, that this broader conception “represents a new beginning rather than an end 
of legal and political debate.”90 In that debate, Orts’ book is an important and provocative 
intellectual contribution. 
In somewhat of a contrast, Robert Wright’s book Corporation Nation develops the 
implications of his solid historical research too aggressively.91 The book is a deeply re-
searched historical treatment of the development of business firms in the United States 
from the earliest days of the republic. The core chapters (four through six) present won-
derful detail, painstakingly gathered, to inform and perhaps modify the standard view 
among corporate law professors about the problems with special state grants of authority 
necessary to incorporate a company, and the effects of general incorporation statutes start-
ing to be adopted by the states in the late 1800s. What Wright shows in chapter four, enti-
tled “Corporate Ubiquity,” is that thousands of companies were given special charters by 
state governments before general incorporation statutes, and thus, “the ubiquity of corpo-
rations” between 1790 and 1860, and the amount of capital, conservatively estimated, that 
these companies represented was significant.92 He also provides data about the 22,419 
“specially chartered corporations” and their capitalization, state by state over the same 
period,93 and also by type of industry.94 Through these materials Wright provides a much 
more specific, and accurate, picture of the state of corporate America in the era of special 
charters. 
In chapter five, “The Benefits of Big,” Wright argues that the costs of obtaining a 
special charter were not generally a problem, and therefore there was no serious limitation 
on the number of companies.95 Rather, the monopoly power once granted was problematic, 
                                                          
 87. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 88. Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 89. Blair & Pollman, supra note 86, at 46. 
 90. Id. at 250 (discussing Citizens United as “representing the beginning rather than an end of political de-
bate”). 
 91. ROBERT WRIGHT, CORPORATION NATION (2014). 
 92. Id. at 49-59.  
 93. Id. at 58-59, Tbl. 1. 
 94. Id. at 62-63, Tbl. 2. 
 95. Id. at 80-115. 
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as was the entanglement of the state in business, concomitant lobbying, and political in-
volvement by the firms.96 So in some instances, charters were not granted because the state 
was invested in one company and did not want to allow competition, or a state (such as 
New York) might refuse to charter a bank based on the purported political affiliations of 
the bank’s founders.97 Wright argues, however, that if entrepreneurs could not obtain a 
special charter, they could still conduct business as an unincorporated joint stock com-
pany.98 The major factor that determined when industries shifted to a preference for trans-
acting business using an incorporated form was when mechanization affected that indus-
try, and thus there developed a need for larger amounts of capital.99 Throughout the 1800s, 
and even as early as the mid-1700s, though, companies in various industries recognized 
the value of economies of scale, scope and market power, which developments Wright 
traces in many industries (printing, textiles, turnpikes, railroads, insurance, ferries, canals, 
and so on).100 Foreshadowing an argument that comes to play a central role in Wright’s 
analysis, he concludes this chapter by asserting: 
  
[i]t was difficult to rail against railroad ‘monopolies’ [when costs to con-
sumers were falling and the time to travel between cities was becoming 
so much shorter], especially when the railroads were well-governed. 
Later in the nineteenth century, when railroad rates rose and many roads 
had clearly fallen into the grasp of cabals of directors or executives, mat-
ters would be different.101 
 
Chapter six, entitled “Governance Principles,” is a most interesting chapter, discuss-
ing governance principles before the Civil War that gave shareholders far more direct in-
fluence in companies than they have today. Thus, shareholders had power to develop pol-
icies for companies, to appoint committees to investigate various matters, to review 
financial statements and make decisions about the capital structure of companies, and to 
convene meetings to change managers.102 Shareholders could buy shares in installments, 
which then had governance implications, since the subscriptions would only be paid in full 
if shareholders agreed with the direction of the company.103 Directors and officers were 
concomitantly constrained, in some cases with officers even being required to pay perfor-
mance bonds to secure their work.104 Many of these governance principles worked to en-
sure that “everyone conceded that stockholders were the true owners of the corporation in 
which they owned stock.”105 
After this point in the book, Wright’s perspective that “state-centered regulation 
proved itself to be more costly and less responsive than stockholder governance” begins 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 82. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 83. 
 99. Id. at 100-01. 
 100. Id. at 100-15. 
 101. Id. at 115. 
 102. Id. at 117-22, 132-33, 136-37. 
 103. Id. at 143-44. 
 104. Id. at 127. 
 105. Id. at 132. 
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to play a central role in his analysis, with negative consequences for the objectivity of his 
analysis, at least so far as this reader is concerned.106 In chapter eight, “Regulation Rising,” 
Wright concludes that increasing calls for safety, labor, and consumer protection statutes 
in different industries, including railroads, ferries, insurance, and banking, were successful 
in expanding the role of government in shaping corporate governance, a development he 
summarizes negatively as follows: “[m]ost state-directed regulations stuck, however, be-
cause they benefited governments, legislators, and, all, too often, the regulated companies 
themselves, with much of the cost falling on their respective constituents and custom-
ers.”107 Corporate governance after the Civil War increasingly saw shareholder power di-
minished; as the size of companies grew, the number of shareholders in companies ex-
panded, and management increasingly became the province of paid executives with 
reasonably low shareholdings.108 Drawing upon Berle and Means’ separation of ownership 
from control, Wright decries the erosion of shareholder “checks such as the concept of 
ultra vires and caps on capitalization [which had previously] prevented railroad directors 
from furthering their managerial empires by straying into other lines of business.”109 
In applying his analysis of the governance failures after the Civil War to the corpo-
rate governance challenges of today, Wright’s view is that “stockholder monitoring and 
sound management by directors and executives” have been “crowded out” by “the sordid 
history of government regulation.”110 Thus, he criticizes Glass-Steagall’s separation of 
commercial and investment banking because the restriction “solved no economic problems 
but helped legislators get reelected by purportedly fixing a presumed cause of the Great 
Depression.”111 What Wright thinks was a more productive system was having investment 
banks playing a governance role by monitoring companies, extracting private financial 
information, and acting as reputational intermediaries on whom retail investors could rely; 
but this role was dismantled by the Clayton Act of 1914 and policies informed by 
“Brandeis’s anti-investment bank diatribe Other People’s Money.”112 Rather than more 
“state-centered regulation,”113 moreover, what Wright suggests are policies to “restore the 
principles of [stockholder] governance common in the antebellum period.”114 He would 
like to see institutional investors playing a larger role in corporate governance,115 directors 
being more active as monitors, executives forbidden from owning shares in their compa-
nies (so as not to manipulate the prices), but being required to put their “familial assets” 
in their companies; and voting by proxy, banned.116 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 171. 
 107. Id. at 189. “Constituents,” apparently, means shareholders in this quote.  
 108. Id. at 192-98. 
 109. Id. at 194. 
 110. Id. at 220. 
 111. Id. at 203. 
 112. Id. at 202-03. 
 113. Certainly pluralist or new governance legal scholars recognize norms, soft law, commercial standards, 
voluntary initiatives, certification regimes, and many other varieties of non-state-centered regulation. Yet 
Wright’s consistent use of the term “state-centered regulation” in these concluding chapters of the book has a 
strong implication of regulatory animus, in context, rather than an implication of a distinction being drawn be-
tween state and non-state varieties of regulation.  
 114. Id. at 216. 
 115. Id. at 226. 
 116. Id. at 227-29. 
15
Williams: The Emerging Personality of the American Corporation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
548 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:533  
These ideas show a potential risk for any serious academic of interdisciplinary schol-
arship. While the core of the book evidences careful historical investigation, these corpo-
rate governance ideas are deeply problematic. Some are redundant (institutional investors 
are already playing a large role in corporate governance, and encouraging boards to be 
more active monitors has been suggested as a reaction to corporate governance problems 
for the last four decades); some inconsistent (why would it make a difference if executives 
did not own the stock of their company but their “familial assets” were invested in those 
same stocks?); and some just silly and impractical (no proxy voting?). Generally, Wright 
wants to return to antebellum governance, when companies had very few shareholders 
(100 to 1000 at most),117 and most shareholders lived so close to the company in which 
they owned shares that they could participate in the annual meeting in person rather than 
by proxy, carefully watching the management of their investments.118 This social and his-
torical context is so far from the world we live in today that suggesting we go back to the 
governance mechanisms that worked then is a suggestion only an idealistic historian could 
love. That said, Wright has compiled impressive data on the growth of companies in the 
U.S. and on how companies’ corporate governance arrangements used to work when those 
companies were smaller and locally owned and managed, so the book is of value notwith-
standing the weaknesses of the last three chapters. 
 
 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 90-94. 
 118. Id. at 91. 
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